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BRNOVICH V. DEMOCRATIC 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE: 
EXAMINING SECTION 2 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
ARTURO NAVA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court faces a critical juncture in shaping the future of 
voting rights in the United States. The Court’s consequential holding in 
Shelby County v. Holder,1 effectively striking down Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act (VRA), opened the floodgates for new election laws re-
stricting the right to vote.2 Almost a decade later, Section 2,3 another 
core pillar of the VRA—the current safeguard against most racially dis-
criminatory voting laws—is in jeopardy. In Brnovich v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee,4 consolidated with Arizona Republican Party v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee,5 the Court will not only rule on the legality 
of two Arizona statutes, but will likely weigh in on the appropriate test 
for assessing a wide array of vote-denial claims.6 The Court’s decision 
will have implications for voting rights for generations to come.7 
In Brnovich, the Court will determine whether Arizona’s out-of-
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1 See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act unconstitutional and effectively dismantling the Section 5 federal preclearance re-
quirement). 
2 Wendy Weiser and Max Feldman, The State of Voting 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 5 
(June 5, 2018) https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_of_Vot-
ing_2018.pdf. 
3 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (prohibiting voting policies that result in voter disenfranchisement based on 
race). 
4 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020 (granting certiorari). 
5 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020)(granting certiorari). 
6 Amy Howe, Justices to Consider Whether Arizona’s Coting Rules Discriminate Against Minori-
ties, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 16, 2021, 9:00 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/justices-to-
consider-whether-arizonas-voting-rules-discriminate-against-minorities/. 
7 Id. 
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precinct (OOP) policy and its ballot-collection law violate Section 2 of 
the VRA.8 The Ninth Circuit held that both voting provisions violate 
Section 2.9 The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion, invoking the Section 2 Results Test adopted by multiple circuits, 
and find that a fact-specific inquiry should be preserved in assessing 
vote-denial claims.10 At a minimum, the Court should avoid establish-
ing a bright-line rule as proposed by critics of the Section 2 Results 
Test.11 Such a rigid rule runs the risk of masking the nuances that the 
courts must consider when assessing a vote-denial claim for potential 
racial discrimination. 
I. FACTS 
Arizonans have two methods of voting in elections: either in-person 
or by mail.12 For in-person voting, counties can choose to either desig-
nate a specific precinct to each voter or operate county-wide “vote cen-
ters” that provide voters with flexibility in voting.13 Alternatively, vot-
ers can vote by mail as part of the State’s early voting process.14 Using 
this method, voters receive a ballot in their mailbox and can choose to 
either return the ballot back by mail or submit the ballot at a specified 
drop-off location.15 
Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy requires that voters appear on the 
register of their designated voting precinct.16 If a voter is not listed on 
a precinct’s register, she can cast a provisional ballot.17 To determine 
whether the voter cast their ballot in the wrong precinct, the voter’s 
 
8 Amy Howe, February Argument Calendar Includes Immigration, Coting-rights Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 31, 2020, 1:30 PM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/february-argu-
ment-calendar-includes-immigration-voting-rights-cases/. 
9 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020). 
10 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (invalidating voting policies or procedures that result in the “the denial 
or abridgment” of the right to vote based on race). 
11 See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Side at 21, Brnovich v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (granting certiorari), Ariz. Republican Party v. Demo-
cratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (granting certiorari) (filed Dec. 4, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-
1258) [hereinafter Cato Amicus Brief] (suggesting the Court should articulate a jurisprudential 
framework “free of balancing tests and other subjective standards”). 
12 Brief of Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs in Opposition to Certiorari at 4, Brnovich, 
141 S. Ct. 222 (mem.), Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 
(granting certiorari) (filed July 1, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Hobbs Brief]. 
13 Id. 
14 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999. 
15 Id. 
16 Hobbs Brief, supra note 12, at 6. 
17 Id. 
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registration information is then reviewed, in which case the out-of-pre-
cinct ballot is tossed out “in its entirety.”18 
For over twenty-five years, Arizona has offered voting by mail.19 
Since its implementation in the 1990s, Arizona has closely regulated the 
practice of voting by mail by “prohibit[ing] anyone from possessing an-
other voter’s unmarked early ballot” and “criminaliz[ing] fraudulent 
ballot-collection practices, including ‘knowingly mark[ing] a voted or 
unvoted ballot or ballot envelope with the intent to fix an election.’”20 
Nonetheless, in 2016, the Arizona legislature passed H.B. 2023, which 
criminalized “non-fraudulent third-party ballot collection.”21 Excep-
tions were made for a “family member, household member or caregiver 
of the voter.”22 Violations would be classified as a class six felony.23 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to address racial 
discrimination in voting.24 The Supreme Court substantially weakened 
the Voting Rights Act in its 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder.25 
In Shelby County, the Court found that the original formula used to 
determine which states and counties need to seek federal clearance be-
fore modifying their voting laws was outdated.26 The Court reasoned 
that there was “no longer such a [racial] disparity” in voter registration 
and turnout, which had originally prompted the establishment of clear-
ance measures that states had to abide by before modifying their voting 
procedures.27 In doing so, the Supreme Court invalidated “the heart of 
 
18 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999; see also id. (noting that the ballot invalidation includes races for which 
the OOP voter was eligible to vote for, including statewide officers, U.S. President, U.S. Senate, 
and many times Members of the U.S. House of Representatives). 
19 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 839 (D. Ariz. 2018) 
20 Hobbs Brief, supra note 12, at 11 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-542(D) 2019 and ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 16-1005(A) 2016). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 11–12 (citing ARIZ. STAT. § 16-1005(H), (I)(2) 2016). 
23 Id. at 12 (citing ARIZ. STAT. § 16-1005(H), (I)(2) 2016). 
24 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (The Act intended to establish 
remedies for voting discrimination “where it persists on a pervasive scale, and . . . strengthen[ed] 
existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in the country.”). 
25 See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating the Section 5 federal preclearance requirement 
of the VRA). 
26 See id. at 551 (“Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.”). 
27 See id. at 537 (“Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect until 
it was approved by federal authorities . . . . A jurisdiction could obtain such ‘preclearance’ only 
by proving that the change had neither ‘the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.’”). 
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the Voting Rights Act.”28 Post-Shelby County, Section 2 has become the 
bedrock of challenges to racially discriminatory voting laws in the 
country.29 
In its original form, Section 2 was viewed largely as a restatement 
of the Fifteenth Amendment.30 Congress amended the VRA in 1982, 
allowing parties to introduce Section 2 claims by either showing proof 
of discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact.31 Under modern 
election law jurisprudence, parties can show a violation of Section 2 
through either the Results Test or the Intent Test.32 In its current 
amended form, Section 2 of the VRA reads: 
No voting . . . standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State . . . in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color . . . . 
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the political process . . . are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class . . . protected by 
subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.33 
A. Results Test 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-step process when evaluating 
a vote-denial challenge under the Results Test of Section 2.34 The court 
 
28 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html. 
29 See Election Law – Voting Rights – Ninth Circuit Holds Two Arizona Voting Laws are Unlawful 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 134 HARV. L. REV. 862, 862 (2020) (discussing the recent 
shift to Section 2 jurisprudence in challenging discriminatory voting laws). 
30 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991). Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”) (em-
phasis added), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
31 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) 
(“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing 
discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test’ . . . .”). 
32 Democratic Nat’l Comm.v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020). 
33 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
34 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012. 
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first determines “whether the challenged standard, practice or proce-
dure results in a disparate burden on members of the protected class.”35 
Second, the court examines whether, in considering the “totality of cir-
cumstances,” a relationship exists between the challenged practice and 
sociohistorical conditions.36 Section 2’s totality of circumstances analy-
sis is fact-specific.37 The court weighs several factors when determining 
whether “a legally significant relationship” exists between the dispar-
ate burden on minority voters and the “social and historical conditions 
affecting them.”38 There is no threshold of factors that must be met to 
establish a valid Section 2 claim.39 
B. Intent Test 
Under the Intent Test, the initial burden rests on the plaintiff to 
show “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.”40 Discrimi-
natory intent may be inferred “from the totality of the relevant facts.”41 
Plaintiffs may rely on evidence that looks at the broader context per-
taining to the legislation’s enactment.42 A broad review of the evidence 
is permissible because of the subtle nature of discrimination today, like 
the selective placement and relocation of voting precincts in lieu of lit-
eracy tests.43 Once plaintiffs meet their burden of proof, defendants 
 
35 Id. (recognizing that “a mere statistical disparity” is insufficient). 
36 Id. 
37 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986). 
38 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13. (outlining the Senate Report that supplemented the 1982 VRA 
amendments). The list of factors includes, but is not limited to history of official discrimination in 
the state affecting minority groups right to vote, extent of racially polarized elections in the state, 
pattern of discriminatory practices, extent to which minority groups bear effects of discrimination 
in areas such as education, employment and health, overt or subtle racial appeals in political cam-
paigns, extent to which minority groups have held elected office. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. 
Reagan, 329 F. Supp.3d 824, 863 (D. Ariz. 2018). 
39 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (“[T]here is no requirement that any particular number of factors 
be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.”). 
40 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1038 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 265 (1977)). Arlington Heights established a set of factors to be considered when examining 
a provision, including (1) the historical background; (2) the sequence of events leading to enact-
ment, including any substantive or procedural departures from the normal legislative process; (3) 
the relevant legislative history; and (4) whether the law has a disparate impact on a particular 
racial group. See 429 U.S. at 266–68. 
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
42 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
43 See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 221 (4th Cir. 2016) (“In a vote 
denial case such as the one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the legislature imposed barriers 
to minority voting, this holistic approach is particularly important, for ‘[d]iscrimination today is 
more subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6 
(2006))). 
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must prove that the law would have been enacted without racial dis-
crimination serving as the motivating factor.44 Courts must look to the 
actual non-racial motivations to determine if these motives alone can 
justify the passage of the law.45 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2016, the Democratic National Committee and several affiliates 
(DNC) sued the state of Arizona to challenge its out-of-precinct policy 
and its ballot-collection law.46 Plaintiffs argued that the out-of-precinct 
policy and H.B. 2023 violate Section 2 “by adversely and disparately 
impacting the electoral opportunities of Hispanic, African American, 
and Native American Arizonans.”47 Plaintiffs also argued that H.B. 
2023 violates Section 2 “because it was enacted with the intent to sup-
press voting by Hispanic and Native American voters.”48 
After a ten-day bench trial, the district court rejected the DNC’s 
claims.49 First, the court held that, under the Results Test, the DNC 
failed to show that both the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 “impose[d] 
meaningfully disparate burdens on minority voters as compared to 
non-minority voters”.50 The court found that Arizona’s OOP policy af-
fected only a de minimis number of total voters and presented typical 
burdens associated with voting.51 As to H.B. 2023, the court pointed to 
the lack of quantifiable data and the relatively small number of voters 
that utilize ballot-collection practices to show that no substantial bur-
den existed.52 Second, applying the Intent Test to H.B. 2023, the district 
court found that the law “was not enacted with a racially discriminatory 
 
44 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). 
45 McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221. 
46 Brief for State Petitioners at 6, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (granting 
certiorari) (filed Nov. 30, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief for State Petition-
ers]. The Arizona Republican Party, along with several elected officials, intervened as defendants. 
Brief for Private Petitioners at 11, Ariz. Republican Party v. 831 F.3d 204, 141 S. Ct. 221 (granting 
certiorari) (filed Nov. 30, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief for Private Peti-
tioners]. 
47 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 6 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also made First and 
Fourteenth Amendment Claims, which the district court rejected. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 329 
F. Supp.3d 824, 856, 862 (D. Ariz. 2018). 
48 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 6 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. at 9. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 9–10. 
52 Id. at 10–11. 
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purpose,” but rather, was introduced as an election security measure.53 
In a divided decision, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed.54 
Plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit granted an 
en banc hearing.55 Upon en banc review, the Ninth Circuit reversed.56 
First, the Ninth Circuit applied the two-step Results Test to review the 
OOP policy and H.B. 2023, assessing (1) whether each policy created a 
disparate burden on minority voters (beyond a mere statistical dispar-
ity) and (2) whether the totality of circumstances revealed a relation-
ship between the policy in question and sociohistorical conditions.57 
The Ninth Circuit found that Arizona’s OOP policy had a disparate 
burden on minority voters in the state.58 Under the totality of circum-
stances, the court concluded that Arizona’s OOP policy led to inequi-
ties in minority participation in the political process. The court followed 
a similar approach in assessing H.B. 2023’s validity under the Results 
Test of Section 2 of the VRA. Noting that minority voters dispropor-
tionately relied on ballot collection practices outlawed by H.B. 2023 
relative to whites, the court found a disparate burden existed among 
minority communities as a result of the ballot-collection law.59 The 
court then turned to step two—determining whether minorities had ac-
cess to political processes under the totality of circumstances, finding 
that the ballot collection law inhibited such access.60 
Second, applying the Intent Test, the Ninth Circuit held that Ari-
zona legislators passed H.B. 2023 with a discriminatory purpose.61 The 
court highlighted the initial attempts at passing similar legislation in 
2011, relying on statements made by Arizona State Senator Don 
 
53 Id. at 11. 
54 Id. Judge Ikuta was joined by Judge Bea, with Judge Thomas dissenting. See generally Demo-
cratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan 904 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2018). 
55 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 12. 
56 Id. A majority (7-4) held that the provisions in question violated the Results Test of § 2, and 
(6-5) that the ballot collection law was passed with an intent to discriminate, violating both § 2 
and the Fifteenth Amendment. 
57 See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Brnovich v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (mem.), Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (mem.) (filed Jul. 1, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief 
for Respondents]. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 See id. at 13–14 (highlighting “a variety of socioeconomic-related reasons” that make in-person 
voting disproportionally “difficult or impossible” for communities of color, such as community 
sprawl and lack of adequate transportation in American Indian lands). 
60 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 14–15. 
61 Id. at 16. 
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Shooter.62 Senator Shooter’s proposal failed to meet the federal pre-
clearance requirements in place at the time.63 Additionally, a “racially 
tinged” video produced by Maricopa County Republican Chair, A.J. 
LaFaro, added to the racial animus that the court noted influenced the 
passage of H.B. 2023.64 Ultimately, the court found that, but-for these 
legislators’ actions, H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted.65 
The contested decision resulted in two dissents.66 The first dissent, 
penned by Judge O’Scannlain, rejected the “implicit” suggestion in the 
majority’s opinion that any facially neutral law with a statistical racial 
disparity is discriminatory.67 Judge O’Scannlain noted how designated 
voting precincts impose only “burdens traditionally associated with 
voting.”68 With regards to ballot collections, Judge O’Scannlain high-
lighted the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs presented no evidence to 
conclude that minority voters were disparately burdened in their ability 
to elect candidates of their choice.69 As to H.B. 2023’s discriminatory 
intent claims, Judge O’Scannlain criticized the majority for extrapolat-
ing racial animus on behalf of the entire legislature from the actions of 
one senator.70 The second dissent, penned by Judge Bybee, categorized 
the practices at issue as “[t]ime, place, and manner restrictions,”71 dis-
tinguishing them from “status-based restraints.”72 He cautioned that 
such conflation jeopardizes the legality of “countless ordinary election 
rules.”73 Both dissents scrutinize the en bancs purportedly overbroad 
interpretation of Section 2 in its challenges to the vote denial claims in 
question. 
 
62 Id. at 17. 
63Id. (“According to DOJ records, Arizona’s Elections Director, who had helped draft the pro-
vision, had admitted to DOJ that the provision was ‘targeted at voting practices in predominantly 
Hispanic areas.’” (quoting Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.3d 824, 881 (D. Ariz. 
2018))). See supra text accompanying note 27. 
64 See id. at 18 (“The [LaFaro] video showed ‘a man of apparent Hispanic heritage’ purportedly 
dropping off ballots at a polling place. LaFaro’s voice-over narration included unfounded and 
racists statements, ‘that the man was acting to stuff the ballot box’ and that LaFaro ‘did not know 
if the person was an illegal alien, a dreamer, or citizen, but knew that he was a thug.’”) 
65 Id. at 19. 
66 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 13. 
67 Brief for Private Petitioners, supra note 46, at 14. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 15. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 18. 
NAVA_05_02_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2021  4:21 PM 
2021] EXAMINING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 285 
 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners, Brnovich and the Arizona Republican Party, outline 
three core arguments for upholding Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy 
and H.B. 2023. First, Petitioners argue that a law violates Section 2 only 
when it “causes a substantial disparity” for members of a protected 
class to both take part in the political process and in their ability to 
affect the outcomes of an election.74 Second, Petitioners argue that had 
the Ninth Circuit properly applied the Results Test, it would have found 
that the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 do not violate Section 2.75 Lastly, 
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that legislators 
enacted H.B. 2023 with discriminatory intent.76 
1. Substantial Disparity Requirement 
Petitioners deviate from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Sec-
tion 2 by noting that a law “results in” a vote denial only when it gen-
erates a substantial disparity in opportunity for minority voters to en-
gage in the electoral process.77 Articulating their own two-part test in 
challenging voting laws under Section 2, Petitioners argue that Section 
2 requires laws to provide equal treatment, rather than to guarantee 
equal outcomes, to the general population.78 
The first step is to assess whether “plaintiffs have identified a sub-
stantial disparate impact on minority voters’ ability to participate in the 
electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice[.]”79 The 
racial disparity must be so substantial as to demonstrate that the bur-
den extends beyond the typical burdens associated with voting, and in 
fact “deni[es] or abridg[es]” minority voters’ right to vote.80 The court 
must assess the voting system as a whole to determine whether the dis-
parate burden is substantial.81 If the first step is met, the court must 
then determine whether “[the] substantial disparate impact is caused 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 33. 
76 Id. at 45. 
77 Id. at 18. 
78 Id. at 14. 
79 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 15. 
80 Id. at 14. 
81 Id. (“Isolating one provision’s alleged impact from the opportunities provided by the State’s 
entire system flouts Section 2’s command to consider ‘the totality of circumstances.’”). 
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by the challenged law[.]”82 Here, Plaintiff’s must establish a “causal 
connection” between the law in question and the substantial disparate 
impact.83 Both parts are analyzed under the “totality of circum-
stances.”84 
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit applied a less demanding 
standard for providing a Section 2 vote-denial claim than what the text 
requires.85 They allege the Ninth Circuit has established an “any-thing-
more-than-de-minimis-impact-suffices” standard.86 Petitioners further 
argue that the Ninth Circuit steered away from requiring a causal con-
nection between the challenged law and the substantial disparity.87 
2.  Plaintiffs Fail to Meet the Substantial Disparity Threshold 
 According to Petitioners, Plaintiffs failed to prove that Arizona’s 
OOP policy and H.B. 2023 created a substantial disparity in electoral 
opportunities for minority voters in the state.88 With regards to the 
State’s OOP policy, Petitioners note that the “race-neutral” OOP pol-
icy gives all voters the “equal opportunity” to vote in their designated 
precinct, or to choose from the various voting options available.89 Fur-
ther, Petitioners find the Ninth Circuit’s “totality of circumstances” re-
view insufficient.90 They then argue that Plaintiffs failed to show the 
OOP policy caused voters to disproportionately vote at the wrong pre-
cinct.91 Lastly, Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying 
the Gingles factors in this context, a vote denial case.92 
Petitioners raise a similar argument for the ballot-collection law. 
First, Petitioners note that Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial dispar-
ity in minority voters’ engagement in the electoral process.93 Noting 
that the DNC provided no quantitative data about the impact of ballot-
collection laws on minority voters, Plaintiffs allegedly relied solely on 
 
82 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
83 Id. at 23. 
84 Id. at 19. 
85 Id. at 24. 
86 Id. at 25. 
87 Id. at 24. 
88 Id. at 33. 
89 Id. at 16–17. 
90 Id. at 36. 
91 See Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 17. 
92 Id. at 39 (noting that making a state liable for non-parties’ actions through historical conditions 
of discrimination is an overextension of Section 2 beyond its textual limits). 
93 Id. at 40. 
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“select anecdotes.”94 Petitioners argue that, even taking anecdotes at 
face value, no substantial disparity exists because only a small portion 
of Arizona voters make use of the ballot-collection practice.95 As such, 
it is impossible to find a causal relationship between H.B. 2023’s pas-
sage and its role in establishing a substantial disparity in minority voter 
engagement because there is no evidence that a disparity exists to begin 
with.96 
3. Ninth Circuit’s Legal Error in Finding Intentional Discrimination 
Additionally, Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in find-
ing that legislators enacted H.B. 2023 with discriminatory intent. They 
first contend the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the cat’s paw theory in 
“imput[ing] unlawful intent” to members of the Arizona Legislature.”97 
They then challenge the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that election-integ-
rity measures must be implemented only in response to election issues 
within the state.98 Instead, states can take “proactive efforts” to combat 
voter fraud, and insisting otherwise, according to Petitioners, breaks 
with the Court’s precedent.99 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents, the Democratic National Committee and Secretary 
Hobbs, outline two primary arguments in favor of upholding the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision. First, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the 
Section 2 Results Test.100 Second, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the 
Intent Test in holding that legislators enacted H.B. 2023 with a discrim-
inatory purpose.101 
1. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied the Section 2 Results Test 
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Re-
sults Test under Section 2 for assessing vote-denial claims.102 They argue 
 
94 Id. at 41. 
95 Id. at 41–42. 
96 Id. at 43. 
97 See Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 46 (distinguishing the Congressional setting, 
where legislators are viewed as co-equals, from an employment setting, where there are hierar-
chical employment relationships). 
98 Id. at 47. 
99 Id. at 47–48. 
100 Id. at 20. 
101 Id. at 33. 
102 Id. at 20. 
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Petitioners mischaracterized the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision when 
concluding that the Ninth Circuit finds Section 2 violations any time 
there is more than a de minimis impact on minority voters.103 Respond-
ents stress that a bare statistical showing of a disparate impact is not 
enough to establish a Section 2 violation.104 Rather, the Court properly 
applied a “fact-intensive, two-part test” derived from Section 2’s plain 
text, which was further established in Gingles.105 
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis met both 
prongs of the Section 2 Results Test.106 They note that the Ninth Circuit 
properly applied the first prong when the court determined that a sig-
nificant number of minority voters were impacted by both the OOP 
policy and H.B. 2023 (far more than de minimis), leading to a disparate 
impact on minority voters.107 Respondents then highlight the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s application of the second prong, the totality of circumstances 
analysis.108 They argue that the second-prong’s “intensely local ap-
praisal” of a given policy will lead to a Section 2 violation only in in-
stances where a policy “operat[es] in a specific way in a specific con-
text.”109 Respondents contend that the two-prong approach would not 
undermine any facially neutral election law simply on the basis of its 
disparate impact on minority voters, as Petitioners allege.110 To lend 
support to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, Respondents point to unique 
local election practices in Arizona: including the State’s historic use of 
ballot collection practices, precinct assignments, and precinct reloca-
tions.111 
Respondents argue that Petitioners are “[f]undamentally misunder-
standing Section 2.”112 They take issue with the Petitioners interpreta-
tion of Section 2 requiring laws to provide equal treatment, rather than 
 
103 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 20. 
104 Id. at 5. 
105 Id. at 20; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78, 80 (1986) (articulating the need for 
an “intensely local appraisal” of North Carolina’s redistricting plan and holding that the contested 
policy prevented black voters from engaging in the electoral process). 
106 See id., at 20–21. 
107 Id. at 20. 
108 Id. at 21. 
109 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 21–22. 
110 Id. Respondent cites to the Fifth Circuit as a sister court that reasoned similarly. See Veasey 
v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 246 (5th Cir. 2016). 
111 Id. at 22–23. 
112 Id. at 24. 
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focusing on the outcomes of a challenged law—claiming this interpre-
tation is at odds with Section 2’s text and the Court’s precedent estab-
lished in Gingles. To bolster this claim, they highlight the fact that the 
Ninth Circuit’s Results Test parallels the application of the Section 2 
test adopted by other circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits.113 Respondents focus on the two distinct presenta-
tions of a circuit split provided by Private Petitioners and State Peti-
tioners to argue that such a split has been fabricated.114 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Discriminatory Intent Holding Should Be 
Upheld 
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit properly applied the In-
tent Test.115 Under the Intent Test, the plaintiff must show racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose as a motivating factor for the provi-
sion.116 Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit properly applied Ar-
lington Heights factors to the facts of the case, leading to a narrow, fact-
specific outcome.117 They present two incidents of explicit discrimina-
tory episodes that transpired in the lead up to the passage of the act.118 
This includes a racially tinged video released by Maricopa County Re-
publican Chair, A.J. LaFaro, to stoke fear surrounding minority ballot 
collection practices, in addition to false allegations from Arizona State 
Senator Don Shooter when proposing a bill to limit the practice.119 Re-
spondents additionally note that Petitioners mischaracterized the 
“cat’s paw” doctrine, incorrectly implying that the Ninth Circuit 
 
113 Id. at 26. See also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding a district 
court’s finding that Texas’s requirement that a photo ID be presented at the time of voting vio-
lated the Results Test); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court clearly erred in finding that the Results Test had 
not been violated by North Carolina’s elimination of same-day registration, and by North Caro-
lina’s practice of wholly discarding out-of-precinct ballots); Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. 
Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding a district court’s finding that an Ohio law 
limiting early voting violated the Results Test of Section 2). 
114 See id. at 26–27 (contrasting State Petitioner Brnovich’s claim that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
clashes with all other Circuits and Private Petitioner Republicans’ assertion that the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision is at odds with a handful of Circuits and aligns with the Fifth Circuit). 
115 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 33. 
116 Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020). 
117 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 33. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 34–35. 
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adopted the doctrine to show that all legislatures acted with discrimi-
natory intent.120 Instead, Respondents point to the specific factual cir-
cumstances showing that many legislators were “heavily influenced by 
demonstrably false and racially motivated allegations.”121 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court has recognized that racial discrimination in the 
electoral process is pervasive in American society.122 In Bartlett v. Strick-
land, the Court articulated the importance of Section 2 when address-
ing racial discrimination and the right to vote.123 Since the Bartlett de-
cision in 2009, twenty-eight states have passed measures that have 
made it more difficult to vote, and state officials have also spearheaded 
efforts to restrict the vote.124 These restrictions yield disproportionate 
impacts on minority voters. These actions are a modern revival of the 
voter suppression efforts that inspired the passage of the Voting Rights 
Act over five decades ago. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act serves as the modern-day safe-
guard to protect minority voters from racial discrimination in the elec-
toral process post–Shelby County v. Holder. As such, it is essential that 
the Supreme Court affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. First, the Court 
should strike down Arizona’s OOP policy under the Results Test of 
Section 2. Under the totality of circumstances, the Court should find 
that the policy led to a disparate impact on minority voters’ ability to 
take part in the electoral process. Second, while a challenge to H.B. 2023 
under the Results Test is likely premature, the Court should nonethe-
less strike down the law under the Intent Test—finding that racial dis-
crimination served as a motivating factor in criminalizing certain third-
party ballot-collection practices in the State. 
The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy violates Section 2 under the Results 
 
120 Id. at 36. 
121 Id. 
122 See 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (“[R]acial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not an-
cient history.”). 
123 See id. (“Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity 
to share and participate in our democratic process and traditions; and § 2 must be interpreted to 
ensure that continued progress.”). 
124 LaShawn Warren, Voting discrimination is getting worse, not better, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 
2021, 11:41 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/voting-discrimination-is-getting-worse-not-
better/. 
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Test. In doing so, the Court should formally validate the two-step Re-
sults Test adopted by the Ninth Circuit and sister circuits. Arizona’s 
OOP policy indisputably had a disproportionate impact on minority 
voters.125 With 3,709 out-of-precinct ballots cast in Arizona, the dispar-
ate impact extends beyond a de minimis number of voters.126 Further, 
under the totality of circumstances, it is clear that the State’s history of 
discrimination and the State’s recent precinct reassignments have led 
to a heightened burden for communities of color. These negative con-
sequences directly stem from the OOP policy. 
The complexity of racial discrimination inherently calls for the bal-
ancing test invoked by the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Section 2 
Results Test. The history of racial discrimination in the United States is 
complex; social and historical conditions that have bred racial discrim-
ination differ from one jurisdiction to the next. Petitioners, however, 
argue that the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test will undermine any facially 
neutral law that has a disparate impact on minority voters.127 Further, 
third-party critics, like the Cato Institute, which filed a neutral amicus 
brief, have proposed that the Court draw a bright-line rule “free of bal-
ancing tests and other subjective standards.”128 By adopting such a rigid 
approach, the Court would overlook the nuances of pervasive racial 
discrimination which continue to plague American democracy. Like-
wise, the approach undermines the original purpose that animated the 
VRA’s passage over five decades ago. 
Regarding H.B. 2023, the Respondents’ challenge under the Results 
Test of Section 2 is likely premature. The district court’s findings indi-
cate that the ballot collection ban may likely have a disparate impact 
on minority communities.129 Section 2, however, requires Respondents 
to show with certainty that a disparate impact exists.130 Here, anecdotal 
evidence, by itself, is likely insufficient to show that the ballot collection 
ban would result in a disparate burden on minority voters. 
Nonetheless, the Court should strike down H.B. 2023 under Section 
 
125 See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1014 (“Uncontested evidence in the district court established that 
minority voters in Arizona cast OOP ballots at twice the rate of white voters.”). 
126 Id. at 1015. 
127 See Brief for Private Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41 (“[Section] 2 cannot be a freestanding 
ban on ordinary voting laws that lead to racially disparate outcomes.”). 
128 Cato Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 21. 
129 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1032–33. 
130 See id. at 1012 (“First, we ask whether the challenged standard, practice or procedure results 
in a disparate burden on members of the protected class.”) (emphasis added). 
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2’s Intent Test. Arizona’s legacy of race-based discrimination in the 
electoral process persists to this day, at times in overt ways.131 Most re-
cently, legislative efforts to unsuccessfully pass a less restrictive version 
of the same law were challenged through the preclearance process for-
merly in place through Section 5 of the VRA.132 Additionally, the legis-
lative history of H.B. 2023 shows the use of a video with racial over-
tones to stoke fear surrounding minority ballot collection practices.133 
The district court found that “H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted 
without racial discrimination as a motivating factor”134 and therefore 
violated the Intent Test. Thus, while the Court has reason to uphold 
H.B. 2023 under the Results Test of Section 2, it should strike down the 
law under the Intent Test. 
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT 
On March 2nd, the Court engaged in almost two hours of oral ar-
guments for the two consolidated cases. During Private Petitioner Ari-
zona Republican Party’s oral argument, the Court primarily sought to 
clarify the equal opportunity framework proposed by Petitioner for as-
sessing Section 2 claims. Chief Justice Roberts asked explicitly whether 
the test proposed by Respondents was an Intent Test rather than a Re-
sults Test.135 Justice Breyer sought clarification on how the usual bur-
dens of voting fit within the equal opportunity framework proposed by 
Petitioner.136 Justice Sotomayor adopted a textualist approach to chal-
lenge Petitioner on its interpretation of the text of Section 2, noting that 
there is no mention of “equal opportunity” in the language of the stat-
ute.137 Justice Kagan provided a set of hypotheticals describing in-
stances of facially neutral laws that were likely to have a disparate im-
 
131 See id. at 1017–26 (documenting Arizona’s history of race-based discrimination against mi-
nority groups in the State). 
132 See id. at 1007-08 (describing the legislative history of the precursor to H.B. 2023 – S.B. 1412, 
which was withdrawn by the Arizona Attorney General after failing to complete the preclearance 
process). 
133 Id. at 1009. 
134 Id. at 1042–43. 
135 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 
222 (mem.), Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 221 (grant-
ing certiorari) (filed Dec. 4, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Oral Argument]. 
136 Id. at 13–16. 
137 Id. at 19. 
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pact on minority voters to challenge the justification for an equal op-
portunity framework.138 
In State Petitioner Brnovich’s oral argument, the Court focused on 
the substantial disparate impact standard that Petitioner articulates in 
its brief. Chief Justice Roberts took a textualist approach similar to Jus-
tice Sotomayor, inquiring about where the word ‘substantial’ can be 
found in the text of Section 2.139 Justice Gorsuch asked why the policies 
in question might not rise to the level of having a substantial burden on 
minority voters.140 
During Respondents Democratic National Committee and Secre-
tary Hobbs’s oral arguments, the Court focused on three core themes: 
the disparate impact in outcomes for minority voters as a result of a 
specific policy, the totality of circumstances analysis and the relation-
ship between legislative context and discriminatory intent. First, several 
conservative justices—including Justice Thomas, Justice Alito and Jus-
tice Barrett—focused on statistical racial disparities arising from fa-
cially neutral laws, and the threat that Respondents’ disparate impact 
framework could have on such laws.141 Justice Thomas pointed to the 
small number of minority voters impacted by Arizona’s OOP policy.142 
Justice Alito and Justice Barrett provided hypotheticals which pre-
sented facially neutral voting laws that resulted in statistical racial dis-
parities in electoral participation.143 Respondents tried to correct the 
Justices by emphasizing how the Results Test is designed to look be-
yond mere statistical disparities, diving into the disparate impact under 
the totality of circumstances.144 
Second, several justices—including Justice Roberts, Justice Gor-
such and Justice Kavanaugh—drew on an expansive interpretation of 
the totality of circumstances analysis. Rather than focusing on the so-
cial and historical conditions of Arizona, these justices examined the 
federal factors at play, including a federal administrative commission 
from 2005 which advised against ballot collection practices. The justices 
 
138 Id. at 23–28. 
139 Id. at 40. 
140 Id. at 57. 
141 Id. at 69–77. 
142 Id. at 69–71. 
143 Id. at 74–77, 90–93. 
144 Id. 
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also noted the existence of out-of-precinct practices and ballot collec-
tion bans that exist in other states.145 
Lastly, the justices also focused on Respondent’s approach toward 
showing discriminatory intent. Sotomayor questioned how Respond-
ents could prove the Arizona legislature as a whole acted with discrim-
inatory intent under the racially motivated actions of a handful of leg-
islators.146 Justice Roberts similarly requested clarification as to how 
discriminatory intent could be shown, and pressed Respondent on the 
limited evidence in the present case available to show such intent.147 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to assess the Results Test 
derived from Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court should up-
hold the Ninth Circuit decision in challenging Arizona’s out-of-precinct 
policy and ballot-collection ban on the grounds that the policy violates 
Section 2 of the VRA. While many circuit courts have adopted the Re-
sults Test, the test has yet to be validated by the Supreme Court. If the 
Court were to invalidate the Results Test as currently adopted by cir-
cuits around the country, the Section 2 safeguard, as we know it, runs 
the risk of becoming obsolete. This would parallel the collapse of Sec-
tion 5 of the VRA. 
Identifying and challenging racially discriminatory practices in this 
day and age requires a nuanced approach that necessitates a holistic 
balancing test to be effective. The Results Test derived from Section 2, 
currently adopted by circuit courts around the country, embraces this 
holistic approach.  As such, the Supreme Court should lay to rest efforts 
to dismantle Section 2—recognizing that the currently adopted Section 
2 Results Test serves as the proper form of challenging vote-denial 
claims. The Court’s expansive view of the totality of circumstances 
analysis, expressed during oral arguments, lends itself to justifying Ari-
zona’s out-of-precinct policy. Likewise, the Court’s skepticism towards 
a discriminatory enactment of H.B. 2023 signals that the Court is likely 
to uphold the ballot-collection ban. It remains less clear whether the 
Court will articulate any broader guidance as to Section 2’s Results 
Test. 
 
145 Id. at 65–68, 82–89. 
146 Id. at 77–79. 
147 Id. at 99–101. 
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